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''Naming and Necessity'' is a book by the philosopher Saul Kripke that was first published in 1980 and deals with the debates of proper nouns in the philosophy of language. The book is based on a transcript of three lectures given at Princeton University in 1970.〔Kripke, Saul. 1980. ''Naming and Necessity''. Harvard University Press: 22.〕 The transcript was brought out originally in 1971 in ''The Semantics of Natural Language'', edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. Among analytic philosophers, ''Naming and Necessity'' is widely considered one of the most important philosophical works of the twentieth century.〔Soames, Scott. 2005. ''Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 2: The Age of Meaning''. Princeton University Press. Cited in Byrne, Alex and Hall, Ned. 2004. 'Necessary Truths'. ''Boston Review'' October/November 2004.〕 ==Overview== Language is a primary concern of analytic philosophers, particularly the use of language to express concepts and to refer to individuals. In ''Naming and Necessity'', Kripke considers several questions that are important within analytic philosophy: *How do names refer to things in the world? (the problem of intensionality) *Are all statements that can be known ''a priori'' necessarily true, and are all statements that are known ''a posteriori'' contingently true? *Do objects (including people) have any essential properties? *What is the nature of identity? *How do natural kind terms refer and what do they mean? Kripke's three lectures constitute an attack on descriptivist theories of proper names. Kripke attributes variants of descriptivist theories to Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, among others. According to descriptivist theories, proper names either are synonymous with descriptions, or have their reference determined by virtue of the name's being associated with a description or cluster of descriptions that an object uniquely satisfies. Kripke rejects both these kinds of descriptivism. He gives several examples purporting to render descriptivism implausible as a theory of how names get their reference determined (e.g., surely Aristotle could have died at age two and so not satisfied any of the descriptions we associate with his name, and yet it would seem wrong to deny that he was Aristotle). As an alternative, Kripke adumbrated a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object as mediated through communities of speakers. He points out that proper names, in contrast to most descriptions, are rigid designators: A proper name refers to the named object in every possible world in which the object exists, while most descriptions designate different objects in different possible worlds. For example, 'Nixon' refers to the same person in every possible world in which Nixon exists, while 'the person who won the United States presidential election of 1968' could refer to Nixon, Humphrey, or others in different possible worlds. Kripke also raised the prospect of ''a posteriori'' necessities — facts that are necessarily true, though they can be known only through empirical investigation. Examples include "Hesperus is Phosphorus", "Cicero is Tully", "Water is H2O" and other identity claims where two names refer to the same object. Finally, Kripke gave an argument against identity materialism in the philosophy of mind, the view that every mental fact is identical with some physical fact (See talk). Kripke argued that the only way to defend this identity is as an ''a posteriori'' necessary identity, but that such an identity — e.g., pain is C-fibers firing — could not be necessary, given the possibility of pain that has nothing to do with C-fibers firing. Similar arguments have been proposed by David Chalmers.〔Chalmers, David. 1996. ''The Conscious Mind.'' Oxford University Press pp. 146-9.〕 Kripke delivered the John Locke lectures in philosophy at Oxford in 1973. Titled ''Reference and Existence'', they are in many respects a continuation of ''Naming and Necessity'', and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. They have recently been published by Oxford University Press. Quentin Smith has claimed that some of the ideas in ''Naming & Necessity'' were first presented (at least in part) by Ruth Barcan Marcus.〔Smith, Quentin. ''Marcus, Kripke, and the Origin of The New Theory of Reference'', Synthese, Volume 104, No. 2, August 1995, pp. 179-189.〕 Kripke is alleged to have misunderstood Marcus' ideas during a 1969 lecture which he attended (based on the questions he asked), and later arrived at similar conclusions. Marcus, however, has refused to publish the verbatim transcript of the lecture. Smith's view is very controversial, and several well-known scholars (for example, Stephen Neale and Scott Soames) have subsequently offered detailed responses arguing that his account is mistaken.〔^ Stephen Neale (9 February 2001). "No Plagiarism Here" (.PDF). Times Literary Supplement 104: 12–13. . http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/neale/papers/NealeKripke.pdf.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Naming and Necessity」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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